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Abstract
There are fewer cases of such blatant acts to defy and subsequent heroic efforts to re-arrange
institutional norms than the Russian Doping Scandal. In adopting a neo-institutional perspective,
we theorize the scandal as a case of attempted but failed institutional disruption. More specifically,
we draw upon the institutional change literature and the institutional work perspective to explain
the key events surrounding and actor’s response to the scandal. Our analysis utilized Gioia’s
methodological approach to examine secondary empirical data. Findings reveal how stakeholders
circumvented traditional governance structures in an attempt to disrupt institutional arrangements,
but despite this, much of the pre-existing institutional infrastructure has remained intact. We
explain this outcome, in part, as a consequence of the counter-institutional work of key governing
agencies and other actors to maintain the status quo within the international sport.
Keywords: Institutional theory, institutional work, doping, international sport, scandals
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When a Ban is Not a Ban: Institutional Work and the Russian Doping Scandal
There are fewer cases of such blatant and egregious acts to defy institutional norms and subsequent
heroic efforts to re-arrange institutional arrangements than that of the Russian Doping Scandal
(henceforth RDS). The RDS can be viewed as one of the biggest and most high-profile failures in
international governance in sporting history (Harris et al., 2021; Pound, 2020). The scandal centers
on institutionalized doping on an unprecedented scale involving state-sponsored, systematic
attempts to dope Russian athletes in order to win medals at international competitions including
the Olympic and Paralympic Games. By scandal, we specifically refer to the process through
which misconduct or transgressions (e.g. systematic doping) as defined by a social control agent
(e.g., anti-doping agencies) becomes public and which could potentially have negative or
damaging effects on other parties (Adut, 2005). Scandals are therefore potentially transformative
events, often mediated by social-control agents (Greve et al., 2010), that could lead to fundamental
societal change.
The RDS case included manipulation, deceit, and cover-ups by key individuals and
organizations, some of which were directly connected to international sport and domestic antidoping networks, in order to maintain the doping regime. The latter phase of the scandal also
involved a deliberate attempt by Russian officials and the Russian secret service to swap dirty
urine with clean samples in the lead up to and during the Sochi 2014 Winter Olympic Games in a
process known as the disappearing positive methodology (IP Report 1, 2016). The RDS case
reveals inherent governance failings in international sport including inept regulatory structures and
poor governance practices. In some instances, these failings led to criminal offenses such as
collusion, corruption, bribery, death threats, and the highly suspicious deaths of former high-level
anti-doping officials. Drawing from the institutional work literature, we analyze the type of work
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done to restore the legitimacy of Russian athletes (allowing them to compete in future Olympics),
and also the legitimacy of the Russian sport system. Hence the title of our paper, when a ban is not
a ban insofar as we seek to explain the empirical paradox of why, despite being banned by from
international competition, 282 Russian athletes were allowed to compete at the Rio 2016 Olympic
Games and 335 Russian athletes were able to compete in the Tokyo 2020(+1) Olympic Games 1.
Thus, our institutional explanation of the RDS can help explain not only why the scandal occurred,
but also the direct responses and outcomes of the scandal including why Russian athletes continue
to be allowed to compete despite being banned from international competition.
The RDS case is empirically and theoretically rich as it involved multiple individuals and
organizations (i.e., actors), all operating at various levels of jurisdiction, with varying degrees of
power and influence. These actors include the Russian government, the state security agency FSB
(Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation), national governing bodies of sport (e.g. the
Russian Athletics Federation), RUSADA (the Russian Anti-Doping Agency), the World AntiDoping Agency-accredited laboratory in Moscow, international sport federations (e.g. World
Athletics), as well as the International Olympic Committee (IOC), the World Anti-Doping Agency
(WADA), and the Court of Arbitration in Sport (CAS), and the media. Consequently, this study
incorporates the messiness of the field (Bourdieu, 1993; Washington, 2004) by bringing in multiple
actors with contradictory interests to examine the RDS case. A critical aspect to the case is the fact
that key individuals (e.g., whistleblowers and other anti-doping advocates) were able to circumvent
traditional governing mechanisms (via the media) in order to expose the institutionalized doping
regime. This study focuses on the role of these key individuals and how they were able to navigate

Russian athletes competed nder the IOC-approved banner of the Russian Olympic Committee at Tokyo
2020(+1).
1
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their environment in an attempt to re-arrange institutional arrangements both within Russia and
international sport.
The events and whistleblowing that occurred in 2014 which inter alia, led to the WADA
investigations which revealed the extent of the state-sponsored doping regime were only the “tip
of the iceberg” (Hermann, 2019, p. 45) of doping within international sport. Recent investigations
should therefore be understood and interpreted within the broader socio-political context of postsovietism, Eastern bloc and GDR dominance of international sport throughout the 1950s to 1980s
(Green & Houlihan, 2005) and alongside claims that Russia has been systematically doping since
the Cold War era, with doping a central feature of the Russian sporting system for the past 50 years
(Dennis & Grix, 2012). From an institutional perspective, the doping regime in Russia can be
viewed as an enduring institution that has taken for granted social, cognitive and normative beliefs
surrounding it (Scott, 1995). Seen from this perspective, the actions of whistleblowers and key
anti-doping stakeholders can be understood as an attempt to disrupt an institution (i.e. the statesponsored doping regime within Russia).
In utilizing this perspective, we provide a neo-institutional explanation of how and why the
scandal occurred. More specifically, we draw upon theoretical advancements within the
organizational institutionalism literature, namely the institutional work perspective (Lawrence &
Suddaby, 2006; Lawrence, Suddaby, & Leca, 2009) in addition to Seo and Creed’s (2002)
institutional change framework, to provide a more complex and nuanced understanding the
underlying mechanisms that led to, and the consequences of, the high-profile scandal for
international sport. To this end, we seek to answer the following research question: How did
stakeholders attempt to disrupt and subsequently respond to institutionalized doping arrangements
in Russia?
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This study contributes to the sport management literature by extending our understanding
of counter-work as a potential mechanism for maintaining institutional arrangements. Previous
research has examined, for example, the influence of newly created actors on existing institutional
arrangements (Dowling & Smith, 2016), how actors respond to attempts to disrupt or reconfigure
institutional arrangements (Agyemang et al., 2018), navigate competing institutional pressures
(Pedras et al., 2020), respond to changes and innovations (Nite & Washington, 2017), and examine
how actors are able to dominate industries through their actions (Nite, 2017; Nite & Washington,
2017; Washington & Ventresca, 2008). A potential shortcoming of these previous studies is that
they often assume linearity with the process of ‘work’ being done from one actor (principal) to
another (agent). In contrast, we view institutional work as a dialectical interplay between various
actors, whereby work and counter-work occur simultenaously and in response to other actors in an
ongoing interpretive struggle. We believe this to be a more complex and nuanced understanding
of the change process (summarized in Figure 1).
Our institutional explanation of the RDS helps explain not only how and why the scandal
occurred, but it also highlights the inherent resiliency of institutional arrangements in sport. That
is, even despite high-profile visible attempts to disrupt institutional arrangements (e.g.
whistleblowing), many institutions are able to respond to such threats through mechanisms such
as counter-work in order to maintain the existing social order. Theoretically, we also think this
case extends institutional theory by highlighting the “messiness” of instutional change. Often
institutional change research examines a dominant protagonist and examines how a challenger
fought (and won or lost) to change the dominant order. Drawing on the work of organizational
fields, we suggest that institutional change is more messy and involves many actors that fight to
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change, disrupt, or stabilize the field. Finally, we also contribute to the growing work on scandals
by examining how institutions work to make scandals appear as if they never happened.
We begin by providing an overview of our theoretical framework which draws upon the
institutional change literature. More specifically, we integrate the institutional work perspective
(Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Lawrence et al., 2009) within a framework of institutional change
(Seo & Creed, 2002). In assuming no prior knowledge, we then briefly outline the research context
in which our analysis focuses. Next, we outline our methodological approach including the
empirical data in which our analysis is based. We then examine how stakeholders attempted to
disrupt and respond to existential threats in order to disrupt and maintain existing institutional
arrangements within the Russian and international Olympic sport systems. Finally, we conclude
with empirical and theoretical contributions and practical implications for international sport.
Conceptual Framework
This study draws upon the scandal literature, institutional work perspective (Lawrence & Suddaby,
2006; Lawrence, Suddaby, & Leca, 2009), and Seo and Creed’s (2002) account of institutional
change to examine the events and specific practices that occurred before, during and after the initial
reports concerning the RDS. In his work examining the trial of Oscar Wilde, Adut (2005) describes
a scandal as a disruptive public display of some transgression. Thus, for misconduct to become
scandals first, misconduct (or in his words transgressions) need to become public, and second, the
publicity needs to be disruptive or jolt society (or the key stakeholders involved) into awareness
of the misconduct. The primary challenge for the the stakeholders wanting to address the
misconduct is to figure out how to redraw the line that has been crossed while also calculating the
penality for redrawing the line (Greve et al. 2010). Furthermore, the literature demonstrates that
many of these practices become normalized within organizational structures and processes in order
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to preserve the institutional order (Nite & Nauright, 2020). The challenge for the stakeholders
embroiled in the scandal is either to make the scandal go away or to minimize the penalities for
committing the misconduct that led to the scandal. The work of redrawing lines, making the
scandal go away, and creating and minimizing penalities all represent types of institutional work.
Institutional work
The concept of institutional work describes “the purposive action of individuals and organizations
aimed at creating, maintaining and disrupting institutions” (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006, p. 215).
In recent years, this approach has evolved into a distinct research tradition that focuses “on
understanding how, why and when actors work to shape sets of institutions, the factors that affect
their ability to do so, and the experience of these efforts for those involved” (Hampel et al., 2017,
p. 558). In their seminal work, Lawrence and colleagues (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Lawrence
et al., 2009) outlined the institutional work perspective identifying three broad categories of
institutional work: creation, maintenance and disruption. Importantly, the institutional work
perspective sensitizes the reader to the fact that:
institutions shape every facet of human existence, providing meaning and motivation to
our action, and holding together the material and symbolic structures that trigger and shape
those action; at the same time, however, institutions are ongoing human accomplishments,
constructed, and maintained by people’s behavior, thoughts and feelings, often in ways that
are non-reflexive and unintended, but just as often in ways that reflect people’s institutional
awareness, their desires to affect institutional arrangements, and the skills and resources
they marshal to achieve those desires (Hampel et al., 2017, p. 559).
Institutional work, therefore, provides an analytical approach that centers on the practical actions
of actors and how they are able shape institutions some of which are “highly visible and dramatic”
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whilst others are “nearly invisible and often mundane…day-to-day activities” (Lawrence et al.,
2009, p. 1).
Researchers have examined various sporting contexts utilizing the institutional work
perspective including governing agencies (e.g., Dowling & Smith, 2016; Nite, 2017; Nite et al.,
2019), clubs (e.g., Lok & de Rond, 2013; Riehl et al., 2019), player unions (Cocchiarella &
Edwards, 2020), community sport organizations (Oja et al., 2019), sexual abuse (Nite & Nauright,
2020), and mixed martial arts gyms (Helms & Patterson, 2014; Woolf et al., 2016). Additionally,
these studies have sought to understand how actors are able to influence institutional arrangements
across multiple levels of analysis including the individual/micro (e.g. Lok & de Rond, 2013),
organizational (e.g. Nite, 2017; Nite et al., 2019), and field-levels (e.g. Meier & Reinbold, 2018).
These studies have mainly focused on how individual/organizational actors are able to create or
maintain sport or sport-related institutions with only a few studies explicitly addressing how actors
are able to disrupt institutional arrangements. This is also consistent with Nite and Edward’s (2021)
suggestion that sport management scholarship has not sufficiently addressed how actors engage in
institutional disruption work.
One possible theoretical/empirical explanation for a lack of studies focusing on
institutional disruption work is that there is little evidence of disruption occurring within sport.
This explanation is also consistent with Lawrence and Suddaby’s (2006) viewpoint that empirical
studies of institutional disruption and deinstitutionalization are quite rare. Previous research, often
pre-dating Lawrence and Suddaby’s formal labelling of ‘institutional work’, has highlighted
practices that can be viewed as disruptive (for example see Slack & Hinings’ study of Sport Canada
and Washington’s analysis of the National Collegiate Athletics Association).
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Another explanation for the relatively slim literature on disruption/deinstitutionalization is
that (sport) researchers have traditionally been more interested in, and have therefore focused
upon, explaining how sporting institutions are created, how actors have been able to maintain their
permeance, or explain why certain organizations have been able to dominate particular industries
(e.g. Nite, 2017; Nite & Washington, 2017; Nite, Washington, & Ige, 2016; Washington &
Ventresca, 2008). Perhaps yet another more practical explanation is that researchers have been
unable to identify or get access to specific cases of disruption as and when they occur. In short, we
think that this latter explanation is most convincing. Clearly, the sport management literature
reveals “a significant gap…examining institutional disruption work, thus warranting further
studies to continue the advancement of institutional theory within sport management” (Nite &
Edwards, 2021, p. 11) .
Institutional change
In addition to the institutional work perspective, our analysis also draws upon Seo and Creed’s
(2002) conception of institutional change to explain how and why the RDS occurred and its likely
consequences for international sport. Seo and Creed’s (2002) account views institutional change
as an outcome of dynamic interactions between institutional contradictions and human praxis.
Contradictions illustrate the “ruptures and inconsistencies both among and within the established
social arrangements” (p. 225), whereas praxis conveys “political action embedded in a historical
system of interconnected yet incompatible institutional arrangements” (p. 223). Central to their
account of institutional change is the assumption that institutions become embedded and
unresponsive to their external environment, creating contradictions and tensions which accumulate
over time. For Seo and Creed (2002), these contradictions and tensions “are the inevitable byproducts of the ongoing social construction of those institutions” (p. 228) and that “the
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development of social contradictions is a necessary driving force for praxis” with “human agency
for institutional change [being] inseparable from institutional contradictions” (p. 231).
The institutional work perspective and Seo and Creed’s institutional change framework are
complementary insofar as they give prominence to the role of actors in being able to shape
institutional arrangements. In addition, this literatures offers helpful insights to respond to the
theoretical ‘paradox of embedded agency’ (i.e., how can actors who are embedded within
institutional settings to think and act otherwise; Holm, 1995). Hence, we argue that Seo and
Creed’s institutional change framework combined with Lawrence and Suddaby’s (2006)
institutional work perspective offers a robust, theoretically driven, agent-centered, and practiceoriented account of institutional change that can help explain the underlying mechanisms of how
and why the scandal occurred and further explicate the likely consequences for international
Olympic sport. Additionally, combining these approaches enables the generation of new
theoretical insights to demonstrate the messiness and complexity of the institutional change
process that has not been sufficiently captured to date by either the sport management or the
mainstream management literature. The next section provides a brief outline of the case before we
present our methods and findings.
Research Context - The Russian Doping Scandal
The RDS represents a systemic, state-sponsored program of doping aimed at giving Russian
athletes a competitive advantage against international competitors in international sport. This
newer, systemic approach to doping was born out of the opportunity of the recently developed
anti-doping structures, purposively initiated on the back of a poor Russian performance at
Vancouver, 2010 and the need to demonstrate superiority on the home stage for Sochi, 2014. For
brevity, the scandal can be seen to center on three elements. First, the Russian state and Russian
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sport systems colluded to manipulate and run the country’s anti-doping structures so that these
structures strategically supported doping among selected Russian athletes. This was achieved by
(i) protecting doping athletes by strategically targeting certain athletes and events, while ignoring
others (ii) developing bespoke drug cocktails that were highly effective but difficult to detect, and
(iii) switching the samples of protected athletes so that clean rather than dirty samples were tested,
as was the case at the Sochi, 2014 games. Second, the Russian Athletics Federation created a
payment scheme with the International Athletics Federation (World Athletics) so that Russian
athletes could pay officials to keep positive results covered up. Third, WADA, the IOC, and CAS
has been seen to exhibit slow and misguided leadership in addressing the allegations of systemic
doping in Russia. These governance missteps have exacerbated the scandal and extended the story
of misconduct beyond Russia to the structures of international Olympic sport. A more detailed
oversight of the RDS can be gleaned from the cited sources (Harris et al., 2021; IP1, 2016; IP2,
2016).
Methodology
This study is informed by a critical realistic perspective which assumes that reality exists
independently and that unobservable structures cause observable events (Bhaskar, 1978).
Consistent with critical realist and the neo-institutional assumptions, we argue that agents are both
enabled and constrained by institutional arrangements but also are able to shape and influence
these structural arrangements (Battilina, 2006).
Data Sources
We utilized secondary empirical data collected from February 2010 to June 2020 to address the
first known reports of the scandal through to the most recent IOC sanctions and CAS hearings
prior to Tokyo 2020(+1). Our study utilizes a range of documentation including organizational
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reports (e.g. IOC taskforce, independent commission/person reports), press releases, interview
transcripts, books, and written testimony from key whistleblowers. The independent commission
and independent person reports contained detailed testimonial accounts of coaches, athletes and
administrators – all of which were important in understanding how actors were attempting, and
continue to attempt, to shape institutional arrangements. A total of 23 documents were included in
our analysis, comprising of 2577 pages. See Table 1 for a full list of data sources.
***insert table 1 (data sources) about here***
Data Analysis
Our analysis adopted a qualitative approach that most closely aligns with the “Gioia method”
(Gioia, 1994; Gioia et al., 2013). This approach is well-established within the mainstream
management (Gehman et al., 2018) and sport studies literature (e.g. Fahlén & Stenling, 2019; Nite
& Nauright, 2020; Singer et al., 2019), offering a rigorous, systematic, and inductive approach to
data analysis that emphasizes the process by which actors construct and understand their lived
experiences. More specifically, the Gioia method utilized here delineates themes and aggregates
theoretical dimensions based on the secondary data utilizing a four-stage process: Stage 1 involved
generating an initial understanding of the key events of the scandal through reading and re-reading
data sources. This stage included identifying key stakeholders and producing a detailed
chronological order of events (see Table 2). In stage 2, a process of data reduction and re-ordering
(Strauss & Corbin, 1990) took place to highlight shorter temporal sequences and relationships
between events. Both the first and second author conducted stage 1 and 2 of the analytical process
independently before agreeing the key events/timelines, aggregate first-order concepts, and second
order themes. Any discrepancies were resolved through a discussion involving all three authors.
We then compared and discussed the appropriateness of each criterion before proceeding to the
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next stage. Stage 3 comprised the generation of first-order codes based on the chronological events
followed by a process to verify their appropriateness – see below. Stage 4 then utilized axial coding
to aggregate first-order concepts to second-order themes (see middle and left side of Table 3). This
stage also involved the deductive application Seo and Creed’s (2002) framework of institutional
change and Lawrence and Suddaby’s institutional work framework to identify and explain
particular instances of disruption and maintenance.
***Table 2 (Data Structure) about here***
Research Quality
A number of steps were taken throughout the research process in order to ensure the accuracy and
trustworthiness of the data and findings. This included drawing upon multiple sources as a form
of triangulation in order to identify first-order concepts and second order themes. Not only did this
ensure the accuracy of the data collected, but this approach was consistent with the philosophical
underpinnings of the study in that it captured the multiple realities of actors within the field.
Furthermore, it was important to include both secondary sources (e.g. reports, press releases) and
primary accounts (testimonials, interview transcripts), as the latter enabled us to directly
understand and interpret the actions of whistleblowers who were central to the study. We also
adopted a process of independent verification and confirmation of our findings throughout the
latter stages of data analysis. This involved an iterative process during stages 3 and 4 where the
findings were discussed with the third author, who was not directly involved in the initial data
collection or early stages of the data analysis process, but had in-depth knowledge of the theoretical
constructs.
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Findings
The findings below detail the ongoing work of actors attempting to disrupt or aspiring to maintain
the institutional arrangements that underpin the Russian and the international Olympic sport
systems. On one side, the disruptors were initially made up of key whistleblowers whose efforts
were subsequently galvanized by independent athlete coalitions and a small but dynamic group of
clean sport advocates. On the other side, the actors setting out to repair the disrupted institutional
arrangements and maintain the status quo are represented by the Russian state, the Russian sport
system and a number of key agencies within the international and Olympic sport system. To begin,
we demonstrate how Russian whistleblowers engaged in work aimed at addressing fairness and
clean sport, and ultimately, upholding the values of Olympic sport. Following this, our analysis
underlines the work of the Russian state, and the Russian sport and international Olympic sport
systems aimed at demonizing the whistleblowers to defend institutional practices, re-asserting
institutional powers, and re-gaining institutional leadership. These three types of work, led by
Russian sport and the IOC, have exacerbated previous conflicts and triggered new responses to
secure the support of athlete coalitions and clean sport advocates in order to strengthen previous
work aimed at disrupting the institutional norms of international Olympic sport. A summary of our
findings is presented in Table 2.
***Table 2 (Data Structure) about here***
Calls Made by Whistleblowers to Uphold Olympic Values
The initial allegations of serious doping violations in Russia began in February, 2010 when
RUSADA employee, Vitaly Stepanov noticed concerning patterns in RUSADA’s testing strategy
where specific sports and athletes appeared to be offered protection from RUSADA’s testing
regimen. Stepanov’s initial concerns were corroborated when he started dating and eventually
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married the Russian national team 800m runner, Yulia Rusonova. Over the course of their initial
dating and subsequent marriage, Stepanov acquired a greater understanding of the vastness of the
doping program and the key role of chief protagonists across the Russian state, Russian sport, and
the Russian anti-doping apparatus. Fueled by a deep commitment to truth, a firm moral belief that
clean sport is a valuable, social asset, and a strong desire to stop Russian cheating and dislocate
the contradictions of the Russian anti-doping establishment, Stepanov continued to send WADA
dispatches in the hope that these would trigger external intervention, undermine the normative
assumptions and beliefs about the Russian anti-doping system, and ultimately drive change in these
systems. Stepanov illustrated this sentiment clearly in his written testimony to the IOC’s Schmid
Commission:
What [we] have done is stupid if safety and security were our motivations. But safety and
security are not our guiding values. We are willing to risk our safety and security because
we believe in two important ideals: the value of truth and the value of clean sport… [we]
would love to make athletics cleaner and we are willing to do anything to try to make a
change in a better direction (Stepanov, 2017, p. 2).
While Stepanov was beginning to share insights with WADA so too were other whistleblowers.
In December 2012, Darya Pischalnikova, a silver medalist Russian discus thrower at London 2012,
contacted WADA to report the Russian systematic doping scheme (Ruiz, et al., 2016). Following
this, in July 2013, Nick Harris and Martha Kelner, two prominent UK-based journalists, were
reporting serious concerns to WADA and the IOC about the prevalence of doping in Russian sport
predicated on first-hand evidence provided by Russian athletics coach, Oleg Popov (Harris, 2015).
Despite the growing number of allegations, the anti-doping community did not intervene,
and public awareness remained low, with the latter perhaps influencing the former. This was set
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to change as a result of key individuals using the media as a mechanism to grow public awareness
of the allegations and intensify the pressure on sport to act. In this way, Jack Robertson (WADA
Chief Investigations Officer) introducing the Stepanovs to Hajo Seppelt (Investigative Journalist
for German broadcaster ARD), and Don Caitlin (former U.S. WADA accredited Laboratory
Director) introducing Grigory Rodchenkov (Russian WADA accredited Laboratory Director) to
Bryan Fogel (U.S. Documentarian) proved to be critical moves in challenging the status quo. To
be clear, the high-profile coverage offered by the print/electronic media (e.g. The Mail on Sunday),
mainstream television (e.g. ARD’s three series documentary), and the award winning, Netflix
distributed docu-film Icarus represent a new type of institutional work, acquiring external support
and influence, initiated by a relatively small number of individuals, offering the potential to disrupt
the institutional norms underpinning the Russian and international Olympic sport systems.
Dominant Actors Demonize the Whistleblowers to Defend Institutional Practices
The weight of media scrutiny given to the RDS was met with an onslaught of responses from
Russian politicians and Russian sport officials who were committed to defend, deny and divert
attention from the idea that Russia was cheating. Clearly, the Russian strategy was to develop a
three-point defense. First, that the stories were a product of a U.S. led anti Russia propaganda.
Second, that doping in elite sport was ubiquitous cross nations. Third, that the whistleblowers
should not be trusted. Initially, Vladimir Putin strongly denied the allegations: “there never has
been, nor is there now and I hope there never will be a state system of doping support in sport”
(TASS, 2017, n.p.), reinforcing the idea that the entire story is a case of politics, “a foundation for
building anti-Russian policy” (in Kramer, 2016, n.p.) and that all countries dope, “but we see no
such politically agitated hype” when other countries dope (TASS, 2017, n.p.). Vitaly Mutko, a
close Putin ally (and former Deputy Prime Minister and Former Minister of Sport) also strongly
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denied the allegations, arguing that “geopolitics had taken over common sense” (in Carroll, 2017,
n.p.) and that Russia’s doping problem was “no worse than any other country” (Moscow Times,
2015 n.p.). Mutko went on to discredit the Stepanovs claiming that they were motivated by
“mercantile things, money or a resident permit in some country” (Tsvetkova & Strohecker, 2015,
n.p.). The whistleblowers were subject to further attacks with the spokesman of the President
referring to Yulia Stepanova as “a judas” (Axon, 2016 n.p.), and Mutko attempting to belittle the
whistleblowers, “who is this Stepanov, he was kicked out of here like a swindler, [now] he is for
some reason interesting to the makers of some kind of films… you understand what is behind this”
(AFP, 2016, n.p.). The attacks on the whistleblowers continued from Russian sport officials with
Ramil Khabriev, the former Director General of RUSADA, stating that it was all politicized
nonsense, the product of an “inflamed imagination” and stuff that is better suited to “spy movies”
(Ellingsworth, 2016, np), and, more belligerently, Leonid Tyagachev, the Head of the Russian
Olympic Committee, stating that Grigory Rodchenkov “should be shot for lying” (Walker, 2017,
n.p.). To add to the insidious nature of the overall denial and cover-up, the former leaders of
RUSADA, Vyacheslav Sinev, former Chairman and Nikita Kamaev, former Executive Director,
who knew much about the inner workings of the doping regimen and had shared correspondence
about publishing these revelations, died in suspicious circumstances, sharpening the perception
about the depths to which the institution was willing to sink to maintain the status quo. In short,
the evidence of Russia’s response epitomizes institutional work that seeks to valorize the
normative basis of the institution while, at the same time, demonizing detractors and critics.
In many respects, the institutional arrangements underpinning Russian elite sport were
initially reinforced by the IOC ignoring the allegations, seemingly deferring on grounds of
WADA’s legitimate authority to govern on the issue, and the WADA leadership’s initial
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indecision, inaction and the support that their President, Craig Reedie, showed Russian politicians
and sport leaders. Indeed, we argue that these tactics, specifically the decision to ignore or delay
action represents a new type of work aimed at maintaining institutional norms whereby the very
foundation of the institution is reinforced as it is able to continue to exist, in its current state, in the
face of new information and evidence that could potentially fundamentally disrupt the institution.
Following the ARD documentary, the WADA President’s personal communication with Natalya
Zhelanova, Mutko’s Head of Doping, exacerbated the perceived strength of the institution,
illuminated the delicate nature of international sport-politics relations, and the reinforced the
political and practical challenges associated with effective anti-doping governance. Reedie’s email
to Zhelanova made the WADA President’s personal feelings clear:
On a personal level, I value the relationship I have with Minister Mutko and I shall be
grateful if you will inform him that there is no intention in WADA to do anything to affect
that relationship (Reedie, in Harris, 2015 – 23 August).
Dominant Actors Reassert Institutional Powers
Eventually, the weight of media scrutiny, primarily driven by the evidence presented in Hajo
Seppelt’s ARD documentary: The Secrets of Doping: How Russia Makes its Winner, forced
WADA to create an Independent Commission. After extensive investigation by a team of
investigators, led by former President and IOC doyen, Richard Pound, the IC concluded that Russia
was guilty of “a systematic and centralized cover-up and manipulation of the doping control
process (IP Report 1, 2016, p. 1). WADA responded to the IC report by suspending RUSADA and
recommending that Russia be banned for the 2016 Rio summer Olympic Games 2 , thus

At this time, WADA did not have the authority to directly impose sanctions on nations due to the
scale/scope of the World Anti-Doping Code. This changed in 2017 with the introduction of the

2
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demonstrating, at least theoretically, their competence in policing and ensuring compliance with
institutional norms and rules. However, this work is made all the more problematic by the way in
which the IOC responded to WADA’s recommendation. Here, it is important to make clear that
the IOC was angered by the timing of WADA’s decision and the imposition that they had been put
in – to make a decision on excluding a major sporting nation, with which it has close and deep
historical ties, on the eve of the world’s biggest sporting competition. Consequently, the IOC
decided to ignore WADA’s recommendation by delegating the decision on Russia’s participation
in the games to each respective International Sport Federation. In many ways, this was the perfect
solution to the IOC. They could demonstrate that they were policing the system, treating Russia
proportionality (according to the situation and evidence in each sport), and upholding the principle
of sport autonomy, examples of enabling type work that permit the IOC to reassert its power and
maintain the institutional arrangements of the system.
The IOC’s decision regarding Russia’s participation in Rio 2016 together with the second
IC report triggered the reintroduction of the whistleblowers (Rodchenkov and the Stepanovs), via
key international media (e.g. CBS 60 minutes, BBC, New York Times, Sunday Times) in order to
clearly state claims that the IC reports did not go far enough and the investigations did not
accurately reflect the true scale of deceit in terms of the state coordination of the scheme or the
range of summer and winter sports involved in it. Consequently, WADA created the Independent
Person investigations, with a team of investigators led by Canadian lawyer and previous IC
member, Richard McLaren. Ultimately, these investigations presented a catalog of evidence to
support the conclusion that:

International Standard for Code Compliance by Signatories whereby Signatories not complying with the
code (i.e. nations) could be sanctioned by WADA.

Institutional Work and the Russian Doping Scandal

21

an institutional conspiracy existed across summer and winter sports athletes who
participated with Russian officials within the Ministry of Sport and its infrastructure, such
as RUSADA, the Center for Sport Preparation, and the Moscow Laboratory, along with
the FSB for the purposes of manipulating doping controls. The summer and winter sports
athletes were not acting individually but within an organized infrastructure (IP Report 2,
2016, p. 1).
In contrast to Rio, 2016, the IP reports and the wider international media attention on the RDS,
placed the IOC under pressure to act enforce sanctions on Russia. Consequently, the IOC created
the Schmid (focused on systemic doping) and Oswald Commissions (focused on Sochi 2014
games) to establish the facts based on documented, independent and impartial evidence (IOC,
2017), thus enabling the IOC to further reassert its institutional power. Both DC’s confirmed the
IP’s conclusions, that Russia was guilty of “the systemic manipulation of the anti-doping rules and
the anti-doping system” (IOC, 2017, p. 28).
Interestingly, the IOC pursued a more direct, hierarchical sanction for the 2018
PyeongChang winter Games than was the case for Rio, 2016. They presented a clear public-facing
commitment to the principle of natural justice and to provide a path for Russian athletes who had
not been implicated in the scandal to participate in the winter games. While the IOC did implement
sanctions including a ban of any Russian athlete implicated in the scandal, a ban on the flag,
anthem and Russian team name and unform, a ban on Russian politicians attending the games, the
Russian team maintained a strong, visible presence at the games with a team of 169 athletes under
the designation Olympic Athlete from Russia. This work emphasizes the IOC’s enabling capacity,
on the one hand, to be seen to appropriately sanction Russia, and on the other hand, to allow
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Russian participation in the games, thereby reasserting its institutional power to preserve the
normative institutional arrangements of the international Olympic sport system.
Dominant Actors Regain Institutional Leadership
There is evidence of considerable work taking place following the media attention, WADA
investigations and IOC decision to ban Russia for Rio, 2016, work that is best characterized as
embedding and routinizing practices to demonstrate how the IOC and WADA had regained
leadership of sport and anti-doping, respectively. For example, in response to the findings of the
IC/IP reports, WADA promptly revised the World Anti-Doping Code and developed the
International Standard for Code Compliance by Signatories. These changes, agreed by the
government and WADA’s sport representatives, modified the foundational rules of sport so that
WADA has the authority to sanction nations for future code violations. This change also serves
the convenient purpose of freeing the IOC from direct involvement in the thorny issue of
sanctioning nations for anti-doping related problems. Additionally, in 2017, the IOC created and
funded the International Testing Agency (ITA) to provide additional and independent doping
testing services to International Sport Federations and major sport event organizers. This
innovation was clearly designed to demonstrate the IOC’s commitment to improve the independent
testing available to Independent Sport Federations and major sport event organizers, although the
extent to which the ITA is truly independent is questionable given that it was created by the IOC,
funded by the IOC and largely consists of international sport and IOC representatives. Despite
these concerns, the creation of the ITA and the headline media coverage of its development was
helpful work in reinforcing normative ideas about the institution, not least the IOC’s commitment
to the principles of fair play and clean sport. The final IOC-led initiative that can be seen to respond
to and infuse institutional arrangements is the development of the new IOC athlete 365 portal. The

Institutional Work and the Russian Doping Scandal

23

portal addresses a range of issues such as integrity (clean sport, athlete safety), well-being (mental
health), and the athlete voice (athletes declaration) as well as providing the commercially attractive
opportunity for sponsors to be able to interact with Olympians. In sum, the IOC’s Athlete 365
portal can be viewed as an institutional work designed to embed and routinize the institution
insofar as it can promote an athlete-centered approach to governance while also disseminating key
messages about institutional norms and expectations, and in so doing, this enables the IOC to
reinforce and regain its sense of leadership of the institution.
Discussion and Conclusion
This study sought to examine how stakeholders attempted to disrupt and subsequently act to
respond to institutionalized doping arrangements in Russia. In adopting a neo-institutional
perspective, we theorized the scandal as a case of attempted but failed institutional disruption with
clear evidence of counter-work by actors to maintain the pre-existing institutional arrangements.
To be clear, our findings indicate that the RDS is neither solely a case of disruption or maintenance
but rather an illustration of how, in autonomous systems such as Russian and international Olympic
sport, certain types of institutional work to disrupt are almost immediately met with responses
designed to maintain pre-existing arrangements. In this way, the RDS can be seen to emulate a
three-part ‘Dostoevsky-type’ saga with antagonists and protagonists simultaneously attacking to
demand change and defending to maintain institutional order (see Table 3). More importantly, we
argue that the empirical evidence from the RDS offers an important theoretical contribution to the
institutional change literature insofar as it reveals that in settings where actors are trying to disrupt
an institutional practice, the actors that want to maintain the practice can employ a three-pronged
strategy.
***insert table 3 (The Russian doping scandal as a three-part saga) about here***
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The antagonists in the RDS were driven by their dissatisfaction and discontent with
Russia—in particular, their observations of the contradictions between Russian behavior and the
values of Olympic sport—rather than the more commonly asserted notion of serving and pursing
their own personal interests (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). In the case of the Stepanov family, one
only need consider their personal sacrifice and risks to personal safety to appreciate this point more
fully. Given these circumstances, and particularly the role and motives of the initial
whistleblowers, we argue that Seo and Creed’s (2002) conceptual framework of institutional
change is instructive insofar as it emphasizes change as an outcome of the dialectical interplay
between institutional contradictions and human praxis.
In contrast to normative views about institutionalism, Seo and Creed (2002) would likely
take the view that Russia effectively ‘sowed its own seed’ of destruction through its historical
association with doping in elite sport (Dennis & Grix, 2012; Riordan, 1993). In this way, the very
norms and practices of the institution, and in particular the contradictions in these institutional
arrangements, were the fuel that fed the actor’s discontent, clearly demonstrating the “mutually
constitutive nature of structure and agency” (Seo & Creed, 2002, p. 223). Consequently, in
response to these institutional contradictions, actors utilized their agency to drive attempts to
disrupt and change institutional arrangements. These contradictions are evident in the normative
Russian narrative when compared to the realities of its institutional norms and practices. At a more
specific level, the particular contradictions that trigger and enable praxis for institutional change
start with misaligned interests. Clearly, the institutional arrangements underpinning the RDS
fundamentally misaligned with the interests and needs of the whistleblowers. For Vitaly Stepanov,
we argue that the misalignment between his personal work-related experiences and his personal
values triggered his praxis as a dominant change agent in the RDS. In contrast, Yulia Stepanova
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and Grigory Rodchenkov, experienced a reflective shift in consciousness, driven by their personal
experiences and treatment by the Russian state and sport system as ‘pawns in the game’ and the
slow but significant realization that Russia’s institutional norms and practices were no longer
compatible with their career or their personal safety.
In addition to misaligned interests, the Russian institution had clearly created conditions of
strong nonadaptability, where the institution is “both psychologically and economically locked
in… and unresponsive to changes in their external environments” (Seo & Creed, 2002, p. 228).
The rationale for this behavior likely lay in Russia’s historical commitment to pursue a ‘win-atall-costs’ elite sport culture to symbolically reinforce the notion of communist (over capitalist) or
Russian (over Western) superiority (Arnold, 2018). However, this non-adaptability also triggered
a reflective shift in the consciousness of the whistleblowers, thus enhancing their understanding of
the enormity of the challenge and the need for new, creative ways of working. Thus, the work of
the whistleblowers reinforces the paradox of embedded agency (Holm, 1995). Here, the
whistleblowers, driven by their ongoing exposure to, and experience of, the contradictions of the
Russian sport system, realize their former place as agents that maintained institutional
arrangements, and recognize the need for reflective distance from the past and make the conscious
choice to pursue truth in the future (Emirbayer & Mische, 1988).
It was ultimately the institutional work of the whistleblowers, utilizing their agency in
response to the contradictions in institutional arrangements, that triggered the eventual institutional
crisis. However, our findings suggest that this crisis was not triggered by the initial institutional
work aimed at undermining the assumptions and beliefs of the institution (Lawrence & Suddaby,
2006), but rather as a consequence of the interplay between two new types of institutional work.
Against the backdrop of continuous Russian denials and arguments that the allegations represented
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little more than U.S.-led, anti-Russian propaganda, the IOC ignored the allegations and WADA
delayed intervention, unsure of how to proceed and more concerned with social media chatter and
optics than discovering whether the allegations had merit (Jack Robertson, WADA Chief
Investigations Officer in Epstein, 2016). We argue that this ignoring and delaying response
represents a new form of institutional work insofar as it represents a purposive action, that is the
act and range of work that comes with choosing to do nothing in order to avoid potential disruption
and maintain current institutional arrangements. However, the decision of WADA’s leadership to
sit by and assess the optics was an institutional contradiction reflecting the incompatibility of
WADA’s actions with its foundational purpose – namely an international anti-doping agency
either deliberately choosing and/or not able to respond to allegations of widespread, statesponsored, systematic doping. This incompatibility and contradiction, in turn, triggered a reflective
shift in consciousness in many actors, but in particular, in Jack Robertson, WADA’s Chief
Investigations Officer, which lead him to introduce the Stepanov family to Hajo Seppelt, the ARD
investigative journalist.
The outcome of these introductions led to a second new type of work, acquiring external
support and influence—through the national and multi-national media—to expose and grow
awareness of the scandal to a wider audience (e.g. the German and worldwide audience of ARD),
to place increased pressure on those with responsibility to act (e.g. WADA) and consequently
initiate revolutionary disruption from outside and trigger an institutional crisis. While we see
overlap here with the types of work identified in Lawrence and Suddaby’s (2006) original
framework, we have extended our understanding of how these types of work are utilized through
empirical examination. In this way, the RDS goes some way to addressing Seo and Creed’s (2002)
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critical question about how marginalized or less powerful agents can mobilize the resources of
other participants to support reconstruction.
***insert Figure 1 process model of institutional disruption + maintenance about here***
Ultimately, despite the contradictions, the actors’ praxis including the institutional
disruptive work, the case demonstrates the inherent durability and resiliency of the Russian and
international Olympic sport systems, and the enduring and stable nature of institutions more
generally (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991). For international Olympic sport the resiliency is
undoubtedly buttressed by Principle 5 of the IOC’s Olympic Charter as it legitimizes sports right
to autonomy, giving it the authority to govern its own affairs and ostensibly restricting government
interference in sport. Thus, sport is able to freely govern its own affairs, including implementing
changes in order to be seen to be responding to institutional crisis. Such changes can be seen, for
example, in the revisions to the WADA Code, the introduction of the International Standard for
Code Compliance, and the IOC’s newly developed International Testing Agency. However, while
these changes are important and necessary developments, we argue that they reflect operational
rather than more fundamental changes to the institutional arrangements underpinning sport.
Consequently, we fail to see how any of them might prevent another scandal or how they might
bring about reform and a change in Russian sport. If anything, the failure to deinstitutionalize the
Russian sport system ultimately reinforces the resilience of the pre-existing institutional
arrangements.
In returning to Seo and Creed (2002), it is possible to conclude that whilst the
whistleblowers’ praxis, particularly their institutional work via the media, did initiate
revolutionary change from the outside to create an institutional crisis, this crisis was not sustained
to the point where it brought about institutional change. As previously mentioned, the durability
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of the institution played in key role in maintaining the status quo. However, we also believe that
the actors’ praxis specifically collective action, was sub-optimal. While the use of the media
proved effective in garnering worldwide attention and driving WADA investigations, the pressure
subsided once the regulatory agencies were perceived to be taking the issue seriously. We argue
that a sustained collective action, with engagement from governments, sponsors, broadcasters and
fans, would more likely have the political and financial leverage to disrupt the institution and bring
about fundamental change. More broadly, we think that the reason why RDS might not have led
to any type of lasting institutional change is due to the ability of the protagonists to ‘do work, while
not actually doing any work’. Once the media and other stakeholders thought that Russia was
taking this issue seriously, they have subsequently backed off their pressure calling for change. As
often happens with scandals, one way scandals go away is that they are replaced in the media with
another scandal.
Our assertion that the institution did not change due to lack of sustained media pressure
might be tested over the coming months. In December, 2020 CAS ruled on WADA v. RUSADA
(2020/O/6689), with CAS softening the sanctions imposed on Russia on the grounds of
proportionality. This decision has re-started the pendulum-like work of antagonists and
protagonists. In this latest turn, the contest has moved on to a different group of antagonists (e.g.
Global Athlete, AthletesCAN, German Athletes, The Athletics Association, Clean Sport
Collective) and a fight over a different institutional arrangement (i.e. sanctions). This new group
of actors are vocal, active on social media, and keen to challenge governments, sponsors,
broadcasters and fans to demand more of international Olympic sport. Further, these actors
represent a self-professed ‘activist base’ that can address the disconnect between sport governance
and athletes, and drive change across world sport. In addition to this work, the U.S., government
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are continuing to apply pressure on WADA to change, primarily by initiating work aimed at
disconnecting sanctions. This work began with the first-of-its-kind White House summit on AntiDoping, largely designed to bring high profile speakers together to denounce WADA and their
ability to govern anti-doping effectively. This was followed by the US Congress passing the
Rodchenkov Anti-Doping Act authorizing the U.S. to impose criminal sanctions on
individuals/groups involved in international doping fraud (116th Congress, 2020). The passing of
this Act was followed in May 2021 with the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy
(ONDCP) submitting a report to the U.S. Congress focused on calls for the major reform of WADA
or for the U.S. government, the largest single government contributor to WADA to continue to
withhold its funding to WADA. In sum, the intervention of U.S. government marks an interesting
development as national governments (excluding Russia) have been quiet, largely (self) excluded
from the work of antagonists or protagonists, leaving sport to govern its own affairs in line with
principle 5 of the IOC Olympic Charter 3 . In this way, the principle of autonomy has been a
powerful device in enabling international Olympic sport to maintain the status quo. Thus, while it
is likely that these developments mark the start of a new series of institutional work that will lead
to changes in the dominant institution, it is unlikely that this work will lead to total disruption.
Notably, in cases such as this, institutions do not actually die in the sense of being wiped off the
face of the earth, they are more so reincarnated where they come back in a highly recognizable
form but with slightly different actions, processes, and practices.

Fundamental Principle 5 of the IOC’s Olympic Charter states that: “Recognizing that sport
occurs within the framework of society, sports organizations within the Olympic Movement shall apply
political neutrality. They have the rights and obligations of autonomy, which include freely establishing
and controlling the rules of sport, determining the structure and governance of their organizations,
enjoying the right of elections free from any outside influence and the responsibility for ensuring that
principles of good governance be applied” (IOC, 2019, p. 11).
3
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In turning to the study contributions, we add to the institutional work literature through
utilizing the RDS as an empirical case to expose how actors engaged in differing types of work
aimed at either disrupting or maintaining the institutional arrangements of the Russian and
international Olympic sport systems. The RDS case has particular merit as empirical studies of
institutional disruption and deinstitutionalization are rare (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). The
analysis also contributes to the little that we know about actors who defy institutional rules in the
interests of particular causes or values (Agyemang et al., 2018), thereby responding to Nite and
Edward’s (2021) call for more research that directly examines institutional disruption work by
focusing on the concerted efforts of interested actions to disrupt institutions. In addition, our work
contributes to the scandal literature by examining the multiple sides of a scandal. Often it is
assumed that scandals, once defined as such by a social control agent (in our case WADA, or the
IOC) would lead to clear penalties that would have lasting (at least reputational) affects. By
examining the many different actors involved in this case (the messiness of a field approach) we
have shown how different actors work to not only reduce the penalities, but also to redefine the
scandal in a way that makes it go away (back to our title of when is a ban not a ban). As our
analysis of the messiness of the institutional arrangements surrounding the doping scandal reveals,
there continues to be a shift in what is considered to be acceptable behavior by social control agents
(namely IOC and WADA) within international sport. This shift, combined with the
institutionalization of normalized practices surrounding doping, institutional rigidity and
reluctance to change, and the persistent power asymmetries that continue to characterize
international sport, ultimately contributed to the scandal.
Finally, our analysis reveals that that despite considerable effort by key actors both within
the Russian state and international sport, it appears that much of the pre-existing institutional
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infrastructure remains intact. Consequently, we would question the extent to which any meaningful
change or reform has occurred. Future research could empirically verify the nature and extent of
change that has (or has not) occurred in this case. Additionally, future research could examine
range of scandals confronting sport governance from an institutional work perspective, including
for example sexual abuse (e.g. Nite & Nauright, 2020), sex testing in athletics, corruption and
bribery in international sport federations e.g. football/soccer, weighlitfing, volleyball, etc.), and
overt governmental involvement in sport (e.g. Belarus). Further studies are also needed to examine
in-detail the decision-making and experiences of the whistleblowers either through primarily or
secondary accounts. We believe that understanding these micro-level processes and how
embedded actors are able to navigate institutional arrangements holds particular merit for future
research.
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Table 1 - Key Documents and Data Sources
Author
Walsh, D

Year
July 2020

Rodchenkov, G

July 2020

Tygart, T
WADA Intelligence and
Investigations Dept.
AthletesCAN, Athletes
Germany, USOPCAAC, New
Zealand Athletes Federation,
Global Athlete
WADA

Feb, 2020
Nov, 2019

IOC
Mueller, R.
U.S. Department of Justice

Jun, 2019
Mar, 2019

Global Athlete

Nov, 2018

WADA
Schültke, A., & Seppelt, H

Apr, 2018
Feb, 2018

IOC Disciplinary Commission

Dec, 2017

Stepanov, V

Oct, 2017

UNESCO Conference of Parties
to the International Convention
against Doping in Sport
U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on Energy and
Commerce
McLaren, R

Sept, 2017

WADA

Sept, 2016

Multi NADO
IOC

July, 2016
July, 2016

McLaren, R

July, 2016

WADA (Independent
commission)
WADA (Independent
commission)
WADA

Jan, 2016

Oct, 2019

Jul, 2019

Feb, 2017
Dec, 2016

Nov, 2015
Nov, 2015

Document
The Russian Affair: The true story of the couple
who uncovered the greatest sporting scandal
The Rodchenkov Affair: How I brought Down
Putin’s Secret Doping Empire
Testimony to Senate Commerce Committee
Final Report to the CRC regarding the Moscow
Data
Letter to Thomas Bach, IOC President

Pages
374

Progress of the Anti-Doping System in light of
the Russian Doping Crisis
Olympic Charter (rev. 26 June, 2019)
Report on the Investigation into Russian
Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election
(Mueller Report)
Statement by Global Athlete on criticism of
WADA by world’s athletes and other antidoping reformers
Code Compliance by Signatories
Russia is still remaining doping country. No
changes at all: Interview with Grigory
Rodchenkov [published transcript]
IOC Disciplinary Commission’s Report to the
IOC’s Executive Board (Schmid report)
Written testimony of Vitaly Stepanov
[submitted to IOC Schmid Disciplinary
Commission]
Review of the national anti-doping policy of the
Russian Federation in the context of the Policy
Advice Project
Ways to Improve and Strengthen the
International Anti-Doping System
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The independent person 2nd report (Mclaren/IP
report 2)
Report of the Independent Observers – Games
of the XXXI Olympiad, Rio de Janeiro 2016
Letter to Thomas Bach, IOC President
IOC Statement – Russian Athletes in the
Olympic Games Rio 2016
The independent person report (Mclaren/IP
report 1)
The independent commission report #2 (IC
report 2)
The independent commission report #1: final
report (IC report 1)
Foundation Board minutes of meeting
Total

151

296
10
62
2

106
448
2
69
8
30
33
94
207

55
5
3
95
95
335
56
2577
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Data Structure: First-order Concepts, Second-order Themes, and Aggregate Dimensions
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Table 3
The Russian Doping Scandal as a Three-Part Saga
Act
Act 1

Antagonists
Whistle-blowers report allegations
Stepanov’s work with ARD on 3
documentaries

Protagnonists
Russia denies allegations
WADA launch investigation (IC report)
IOC refuse to sanction, defer decision to
IFs Majority of IFs (all but 3) do not
sanction Russia

Act 2

Whistleblowers respond to IC report
and IOC deferral to IFs (New York
Times, CBS, BBC, Icarus, etc.)

Russia continues to deny
WADA launch IP investigations, IOC
commissions, IOC sanction Russia as
bad actor (sanction, but not really
sanction) for PyeongChang

Act 3

WADA take on/sanction Russia for
data manipulation – 4-year ban
imposed (Tokyo 2020)

Russia denies and appeal case to CAS
CAS water down WADA sanctions and
impose similar sanction as what IOC
imposed in 2018
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Figure 1: Process of disrupting and maintaining institutions
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